The Hohenzollern Legacy

Volume 5, Issue 6, December 2021     |     PP. 404-476      |     PDF (703 K)    |     Pub. Date: December 9, 2021
DOI: 10.54647/sociology84691    77 Downloads     5920 Views  

Author(s)

Robert C. Moore, Free Univerity of Berlin

Abstract
Currently there is lively debate going on in Germany about the Hohenzollern legacy that is focused on the topic, if Crown Prince Wilhelm, and the family in general have supported National Socialism or not. When in November 2019 the four reports regarding the Hohenzollern claims for their ‘lost’ properties in former East Germany were made public, several historians since then have participated in a debate, that went from the material claims to examine the ‘expert opinions’ called ‘reports’ by historians for and against these claims, addressing a German law, that would exclude any claims of compensation, if Crown Prince Wilhelm had ‘significantly advanced’ the Nazis or not. The problem with these reports called Gutachten in German, equivalent to a neutral ‘appraisal’, is that specifically those in favor of the Hohenzollern claims, are anything but ‘neutral’, advancing arguments that are trying to excuse and justify the Crown Prince’ support of the Nazis. This essay is examining the four reports for the first time and showing the differences in providing the reader with the historical context, that is specifically missing in those ‘expert opinions’ that are in favor of the Hohenzollern demands. Discussing the relevant issues along seven topics the author is trying to show the deficiencies of the reports and is interested to set the historical record straight correcting the distortions and adding information that has been left out to boost the position of the Hohenzollern family in their fight with the Federal Government in Germany.

Keywords
Hohenzollern, Expert Opinion, Distortions, Crown Prince Wilhelm, Nazi seizure of Power

Cite this paper
Robert C. Moore, The Hohenzollern Legacy , SCIREA Journal of Sociology. Volume 5, Issue 6, December 2021 | PP. 404-476. 10.54647/sociology84691

References

[ 1 ] The term ‘clan’ is used by Bernd Stegemann, “Deutschlands erster Clan”, Cicero.de, July 30, 2019
[ 2 ] Sven F. Kellerhoff, “Und was ist mit den Toten des Ersten Weltkriegs, Prinz Georg Friedrich?”, Die Welt.de, July 14, 2019
[ 3 ] The contributions by historians started in 2015 and accelerated with the publication of the four ‘expert opinions’ in November 2019, Stephan Malinowski, “Der braune Kronprinz”, Die Zeit, August 13, 2015; Peter Brandt, Stephan Malinowski, “Ein Prinz im Widerstand?” Die Zeit, November 14, 2019; Stephan Malinowski, “Wir Stauffenbergs”, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, August 7, 2019; Stephan Malinowski, “Die Selbstversenkung”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (hereinafter cited as ‘FAZ.net’), July 22, 2019; Norbert Frei, “Die Hohenzollern deuten ihre Geschichte brachial um”, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Aug. 21, 2019; Christian Staas, “Der Kronprinz war ein reaktionaerer Opportunist”, Interview mit Heinrich A. Winkler, Die Zeit, November 12, 2019; Richard Evans, “Das Gewissen eines Gutachters”, FAZ.net, December 10, 2019; Winfried Suess, “Entschaedigung fuer die Preussen-Familie waere moralisch schwer begruendbar”, Schaumburger Nachrichten, August 12, 2019; Ulrich Herbert, “Vier Gutachter, ein Kronprinz und die nationale Diktatur”, FAZ.net December 1, 2019; David Motadel, “What do the Hohenzollern deserve?, New York Review of Books, March 26, 2020; Christopher Clark, “Helping Hitler”, an Exchange, also a reply by David Motadel, New York Review of Books, April 9, 2020; Anja Reinhardt, “Weichgezeichnetes Kaiserreich”, Interview mit Eckart Conze, Deutschlandradio Kultur, July 12, 2020; Eva Schlotheuber, Eckart Conze, “Die Ehre der Familie”, FAZ.net, September 9, 2020; Karina Urbach, “Useful Idiots: the Hohenzollern and Hitler”, in: Historical Research, 93 (261) 2020, 526-550; Andreas Kilb, “Kaiserbanner unterm Hakenkreuz”, in: FAZ.net, 20. 5. 2021
[ 4 ] Speeches and statements during both events on Jan. 29, 2020 can be watched on video at ‘parliamentary TV’ at www.bundestag.de/parlamentsfernsehen; see also, “Bekommen die Hohenzollern, was sie wollen?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 30, 2020; Jens Bisky, “Die Gefahr, dass alle am Ende verlieren”, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Jan. 30, 2020; Dirk Kurbjuweit, “Naeher waren sich Union und Rechtspopulisten selten,” Spiegel.de, Jan. 16, 2020
[ 5 ] Joern Leonhard, “Sperrige Wiedergaenger”, FAZ.net, December 21, 2019
[ 6 ] Regarding the discussion of the Sonderweg thesis and its validity, Juergen Kocka, “German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg”, Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (1988): 3-16; Georg G. Iggers, “Review of Bernd Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges”, History and Theory 22, no. 1 (1983): 74-83; Geoff Eley, David Blackbourn, “The peculiarities of German History, an Interview”, German History 22, no. 2 (2004): 229-245; Juergen Kocka, “Der ‘deutsche Sonderweg’ in der Diskussion” [The Discussion about the German special Path
[ 7 ] Nikolaus Bernau, “Hohenzollern wollen abkassieren – hinter den Kulissen herrscht blanke Gier”, Frankfurter Rundschau, July 24, 2019; idem., “Erneute Hohenzollern Besitzansprueche – warum gerade jetzt?”, Interview, MDR-Kultur, July 15, 2019; Scott McLean, Nadine Schmidt, “Germany’s ex-royals want their riches back, but past ties to Hitler stand in the way”, CNN.com, September 26, 2020
[ 8 ] The Hohenzollern have sued several historians and media outlets to curb their statement legally, Julia Koeppe, “Hohenzollern gegen Historiker, der 250.000 Euro Satz”, Spiegel.de, January 25, 2020; Klaus Wiegrefe, “Historiker wehren sich gegen juristischen Feldzug der Hohenzollern”, Spiegel.de, December 13, 2019, Hans Monath, “Hohenzollern prozessieren weiter”, Tagesspiegel, February 23, 2020; McLean, “Germany’s ex-royals”, CNN.com talks about the legal case against the historian Eckart Conze, who has said publicly that the Hohenzollern tried to suffocate the public discussion; now the Hohenzollern are getting help from some neoconservatives, who consider that the majority of historians in Germany want to usurp the Deutungshoheit (interpretative sovereignty), Andre Postert, “Geschichte vor Gericht”, Cicero.de, September 17, 2020; Patrick Bahners, “Verbandspolitik”, FAZ.net, September 17, 2020; Nicole Dittmer, “Das ist schon eine ziemliche Drohkulisse”, Interview with Eva Schlotheuber, Deutschlandradio Kultur, September 9, 2020; Klaus Wiegrefe, “Der Prozesshansel”, in: Der Spiegel No. 9, 28. 2. 2021; Patrick Bahners, “So schnell schiessen die Anwaelte der Preussen”, in: FAZ.net, 17. 6. 2021
[ 9 ] Sebastian Engelbrecht, “Kultursenator Lederer: ‘Das klingt mir eher wie eine Drohung’”, in: Deutschlandradio.de, February 15, 2021
[ 10 ] Klaus Wiegrefe, “Herr Prinz von Preussen lehnt sich sehr weit aus dem Fenster”, Interview with Sophie Schoenberger, in: Spiegel.de, 14. 6. 2021
[ 11 ] The website was created by Sophie Schoenberger, a professor of law at Duesseldorf University, https://www.historikerverband.de/verband/veranstaltungen/die-klagen-der-hohenzollern-eine-dokumentation.html
[ 12 ] Patrick Bahners, Jan Bachmann, “Wir wollen nicht mehr scheinen, als wir sind”, Interview mit Georg Friedrich Prinz von Preussen, FAZ.net, November 9, 2018, who described his view of the origins of the First World War as follows: “By examining the currents and political movements that have worked for decades on the event of the outbreak of war, a much more differentiated picture emerges regarding the question of guilt. (...) There are many reasons for the outbreak and the course of the First World War. In the meantime, research is moving away from the ‘sole guilt’ of the former government or even the emperor. And I think that is justified.” (all translations by author except otherwise noted)
[ 13 ] William H. McNeill, “Mythhistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians”, American Historical Review 91, no. 1 (1986): 5: “Historians are therefore under perpetual temptation to conform to expectation by portraying the people they write about as they wish to be. A mingling of truth and falsehood, blending history with ideology, results.”
[ 14 ] Benjamin Hasselhorn, “Und ewig gruesst der Sonderweg”, Cicero.de, July 30, 2019; see also, “Wenn es um den Adel geht, scheint es in Deutschland keine Hemmungen zu geben”, Neue Zuercher Zeitung, December 11, 2019; Hans-Christoph Kraus, “Das erklaerte Feindbild der NSDAP waren auch die Hohenzollern – weshalb man der Verlockung einer Abrechnung mit dem letzten deutschen Kronprinzen widerstehen sollte” [The declared enemy of the NSDAP was also the Hohenzollern - which is why one should resist the temptation to settle accounts with the last German crown prince
[ 15 ] Regarding the Entschädigungs- und Ausgleichsleistungsgesetz [Law of Compensation
[ 16 ] Max Black, “The Gap Between ‘Is’ and ‘Should’, Philosophical Review 73, no. 2 (1964): 165-181; John Searle, “How to Derive "Ought" from "Is", Philosophical Review 73, no. 1 (1964): 43-58; Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Moral Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosohy (Stanford, CA 2018)
[ 17 ] David H. Fischer, Historians' Fallacies, Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1970)
[ 18 ] Evans, Gewissen, FAZ.net, December 10, 2019
[ 19 ] Thorsten Metzner, “Hohenzollern erheben Ansprueche auf tausende bedeutende Kunstwerke”, Tagesspiegel, July 13, 2019; Andreas Kilb, “Hohenzollern wollen in eines ihrer Schloesser zurueck”, FAZ.net, July 24, 2019
[ 20 ] Christopher Clark, Wilhelm II., Die Herrschaft des letzten deutschen Kaisers (Muenchen: DVA, 2008) [engl. original, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Life in Power (London 2000)
[ 21 ] Christopher Clark, Preussen, Aufstieg und Niedergang 1600-1947 (Muenchen, DVA 2007) [engl. Original: Iron kingdom: The rise and fall of Prussia 1600-1947 (London: Penguin Books, 2006)
[ 22 ] Christopher Clark, “Preussenbilder im Wandel” [Changing Images of Prussia
[ 23 ] Motadel, “Hohenzollern”, New York Review of Books
[ 24 ] See Clark receiving the Prize of the Historisches Kolleg, Dokumentation zur Verleihung des Preises des Historischen Kollegs an Professor Dr. Christopher Clark [Documentation on the award of the prize of the Historisches Kolleg
[ 25 ] This term was used by the historian Wolfgang Wippermann in his Interview with Susanne Fuehrer, “Antidemokraten nicht fuer ihr Handeln belohnen”, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, February 26, 2014
[ 26 ] Klaus Wiegrefe, “The Man was a Twit. Historian Christopher Clark on the Hohenzollern Dispute”, Spiegel.de, October 26, 2019
[ 27 ] Andreas Kilb, “Wilhelm wollte Hitler nicht zaehmen, Interview with Christopher Clark”, FAZ.net, November 4, 2020
[ 28 ] Katharina Wiechers, “Der Adel soll jetzt Geld zurueckbekommen”, Potsdamer Neueste Nachrichten, February 25, 2014; Klaus Wiegrefe, “Prinz mit Schuss”, Der Spiegel no. 37 (2014): 38-40
[ 29 ] Christopher Clark, Hat Kronprinz Wilhelm dem nationalsozialistischen System erheblichen Vorschub geleistet? [Did Crown Prince Wilhelm significantly advance the National Socialist system?
[ 30 ] Peter Brandt, Gutachten zur politischen Einstellung und zum politischen Verhalten des ehemaligen preussischen und reichsdeutschen Kronprinzen Wilhelm [Expert opinion on the political attitudes and behavior of the former Prussian and Imperial German Crown Prince Wilhelm
[ 31 ] Thorsten Metzner, “Keine Steuermillionen fuer Hohenzollern”, Potsdamer Neueste Nachrichten, January 15, 2016
[ 32 ] Wolfram Pyta, Rainer Orth, Gutachten über die politische Haltung und das politische Verhalten von Wilhelm Prinz von Preußen (1882-1951), letzter Kronprinz des Deutschen Reiches und von Preußen, in den Jahren 1923 bis 1945 [Expert opinion on the political stance and behavior of Wilhelm Prince of Prussia (1882-1951), last Crown Prince of the German Empire and of Prussia, in the years 1923 to 1945
[ 33 ] Evans, “Gewissen”, FAZ.net, December 19, 2021
[ 34 ] Lothar Machtan, Der Kronpirnz und die Nazis [The Crown Prince and the Nazis
[ 35 ] Klaus Wiegrefe, “Der Kronprinz und der liebe ‘Don Adolfo’”, in: Der Spiegel No. 32, August 6, 2021, is also puzzled, that Georg Friedrich von Preussen has paid for a study that has brought in further evidence against the Crown Prince und is assuming that Georg Friedrich is trying to boost his image with a critical study, considering that all the lawsuits against historians since 2015 are not helping his main case to get restitution
[ 36 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 295-296
[ 37 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 10, 240
[ 38 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 10
[ 39 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 242
[ 40 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 10
[ 41 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 242
[ 42 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 216
[ 43 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 217
[ 44 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 244-245
[ 45 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, S. 245; Andreas Kilb, “Die braune Blume der Monarchie”, FAZ.net, August 11, 2021
[ 46 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 244-245
[ 47 ] The historical context of this inquiry is based on the following studies, Heinrich A. Winkler, Weimar 1918-1933, die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie [Weimar 1918-1933, the History of the first German Democracy
[ 48 ] Clark, Report, 3, 9-10
[ 49 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 45-56
[ 50 ] Fredrick T. Birchall, “Republic is in Balance, Opponents of Hindenburg seek to overthrow Democratic Rule”, in: New York Times, March 13, 1932
[ 51 ] Noel D. Cary, “The Making of the Reich President, 1925: German Conservatism and the Nomination of Paul von Hindenburg”, Central European History 23, no. 2 (1990): 179-204; Peter Fritzsche, “Presidential Victory and Popular Festivity in Weimar Germany: Hindenburg's 1925 Election”, in: Central European History 23, no. 2 (1990): 205-224
[ 52 ] Larry E. Jones, “Hindenburg and the Conservative Dilemma in the 1932 Presidential Elections”, in: German Studies Review 20, no. 2 (1997): 235-259; Erich Matthias, “Hindenburg zwischen den Fronten 1932”, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 8, no. 1 (1960): 75-84; Larry E. Jones, Hitler versus Hindenburg: The 1932 Presidential Elections and the End of the Weimar Republic (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 357, states that Hitler was the real winner of the election in the long run, while Hindenburg’s authority had been eroded
[ 53 ] The details by Rudolf Morsey, “Hitler als braunschweigischer Regierungsrat”, in: Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 8, no. 3 (1960): 419-448; Donald C. Watt, “Die bayrischen Bemuehungen um Ausweisung Hitlers 1924”, in: Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 6, no. 2 (1958): 270-280
[ 54 ] Wolfgang Pyta, “Hindenburg and the German Right”, in: The German Right in the Weimar Republic, Studies in the History of German Conservatism, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, ed. Larry E. Jones (New York: Berghahn, 2014): 25-47
[ 55 ] Bracher, Aufloesung, 392-423
[ 56 ] Hindenburg’s objections to Hitler in August 1932, Walter Hubatsch, Hindenburg und der Staat, aus den Papieren des Generalfeldmarschalls und Reichspraesidenten 1878-1934 [Hindenburg and the State, from the Papers of the Field Marshal and President of the Reich, 1878-1934
[ 57 ] Hentschel, Weimar, 74-76; Bracher, Aufloesung, 580-586, Hubatsch, Hindenburg, Doc. No. 91-103, 345-366
[ 58 ] The doctrine of the ‘primacy of foreign policy’ in Germany goes back to Ranke, Ernst-Otto Czempiel, “Der Primat der Aussenpolitik: Kritische Würdigung einer Staatsmaxime” [“The Primacy of Foreign Policy: critical appreciation of a state maxim
[ 59 ] One of the best descriptions of Bruening’s economic policies see Ursula Buettner, “Politische Alternativen zum Brüningschen Deflationskurs. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion über ’Ökonomische Zwangslagen’ in der Endphase von Weimar”[Political Alternatives to Bruening’s Path of Deflation, a Contribution to the Discussion about Economic Predicamanets
[ 60 ] Heinrich Bruening, Memoiren (Stuttgart: DVA, 1970): 417-606 shows the process of his retreat
[ 61 ] Johannes Huerter, Wilhelm Groener, Reichswehrminsiter am Ende der Weimarer Republik, 1928-32 [Minister of the Reichswehr at the End of the Weimar Republic
[ 62 ] Volker R. Berghahn, “Die Harzburger Front und die Kandidatur Hindenburgs fuer die Praesidentschaftswahlen 1932”, in Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgesschichte 13, no. 1 (1965): 64-82
[ 63 ] Wolfgang Stribrny, “Der Versuch einer Kandidatur des Kronprinzen Wilhelm bei der Reichspraesidentenwahl 1932”[The Candidacy of Crown Prince Wilhelm at the 1932 Presidential Election
[ 64 ] Julius Friedrich, Wer spielte falsch? Hindenburg, Hitler, der Kronprinz, Hugenberg, Schleicher [Who is playing false? Hindenburg, Hitler, the Crown Prince, Hugenberg, Schleicher
[ 65 ] Klaus W. Jonas, Der Kronprinz Wilhelm (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1962): 224
[ 66 ] Jonas, Kronprinz, 226
[ 67 ] Stribrny, “Kandidatur”, 203; Jonas, Kronprinz, 225; Theo Schwarzmueller, Zwischen Kaiser und Fuehrer, Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1996): 246-253
[ 68 ] Stribrny, “Kandidatur”, 208
[ 69 ] Clark, Report, 12, 16-17; Pyta/Orth, Report, 53
[ 70 ] Juergen Falter, “The Two Hindenburg elections of 1925 and 1932: A total reversal of Voter Coalitions”, Central European History 23, no. 2 (1990): 225-241, 236-241; for a further discussion of the different factors which influenced voter fluctuation and the reasons for that, Juergen Falter, Hitlers Waehler [Hitler’s Voters
[ 71 ] Jonas, Kronprinz, 231-232, Falter, Hitler’s Waehler, 325-373
[ 72 ] The background of the ‘preventive war’ discussion, Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski, “Did Pilsudski Attempt to Initiate a Preventive War in 1933?”, in: Journal of Modern History 27, no. 1 (1955): 135-151
[ 73 ] The primary sources on the SA-ban, Akten der Reichskanzlei. Die Kabinette Bruening I und II, 3 Vol., ed. Karl-Dietrich Erdmann [Files of the Reich Chancellery, The Bruening Cabinets
[ 74 ] Wilhelm’s letter is documented by Friedrich Wilhelm von Preussen, Das Haus Hohenzollern 1918-1945 (Muenchen: Langen Mueller, 1985): 203-204; Gerhard Schulz, Staat und NSDAP – Quellen zur Aera Bruening [State and NSDAP - Sources of the Bruening Era
[ 75 ] Clark, Report, 3-4, 7, 10-11
[ 76 ] Pytha/Orth, Report, 56-58
[ 77 ] Brandt, Report, 40-41
[ 78 ] Malinowski, Report, 76-78
[ 79 ] Der verpaßte Nazi-Stopp, die NSDAP als staats- und republikfeindliche, hochverräterische Verbindung; Preußische Denkschrift von 1930 [The missed Nazi stop, the NSDAP as a hostile anti-state and anti-republic, treasonable Association; Prussian memorandum from 1930
[ 80 ] Regarding Hitler’s strategy of legality, Roy J. Hulbert, Hitler’s Idea of a ‘Legal Revolution’ and the Triumph of Nazism, A study of Politics and Moral Anarchy (Ph. D. Diss., University of Washington, 1975)
[ 81 ] See Hitlers Statement as a witness at the Reichsgericht and the problem of legality, in: Akten der Reichskanzlei, Kabinett Bruening [Files of the Reichskanzlei, Bruening Administration
[ 82 ] The Boxheim Documents and the reaction, in: Akten der Reichskanzlei, Kabinett Bruening, Vol. 3, Doc. 572, 574; Hulbert, Legal Revolution, 185-230, Vogelsang, Reichswehr, 145-147; Schulz, Staat und NSDAP, Doc. 58, 60
[ 83 ] Schulz, Staat und NSDAP, Doc. 47, 258-259; Robert H. Frank, Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition, 1924-1932 (Ph. D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1969), 532-541
[ 84 ] Huerter, Groener, 307-314; Bruening, Memoiren, 460-473, 461
[ 85 ] Hulbert, Legal revolution, 185-186
[ 86 ] Huerter, Groener, 316; Bruening, Memoiren, 500-516; Dorothea Groener-Geyer, General Groener, Soldat und Staatsmann (Frankfurt/M.: Societaets-Verlag, 1955): 281-322, Vogelsang, Reichswehr, 135-202
[ 87 ] Huerter, Groener, 322-323; Schulz, Staat und NSDAP, Doc. 52b
[ 88 ] Huerter, Groener, reports that Groener characterizes Hitler in a letter to a friend, 324: “He avoids factual conversations and immediately fantasizes through all centuries of history. He talks like in a trance state with a world-lost look, then he starts with a cascade of words, phrases and pictures, without a comma or period, until he has completely exhausted himself. Impossible to interrupt him and return to this planet. One is exhausted from listening…”
[ 89 ] All quotes from, Huerter, Groener, 324
[ 90 ] Huerter, Groener, 324; Schulz, Staat und NSDAP, Doc. 54
[ 91 ] Huerter, Groener, 316
[ 92 ] See the protocol of their conference on November 17, 1931, Schulz, Staat und NSDAP, Doc. 41b
[ 93 ] Huerter, Groener, 349
[ 94 ] Wilhelm Deist, “Zum Problem der deutschen Aufruestung” [The Problem of German Rearmament
[ 95 ] Deist, “Zum Problem”, Francia, 547; Michael Geyer, “Das Zweite Ruestungsprogramm (1930-1934)” [The second Armaments Program
[ 96 ] Matthew N. Buchholtz, The ideological motivations of General Kurt v. Schleicher, the Nazi Movement, and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, 1930-1933 (M. A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 2007): 65-81
[ 97 ] Schulz, NSDAP und Staat, Doc. 26, 41a, 41b, 36, 42, 61, 63
[ 98 ] Huerter, Groener, 336-340; Schulz, Staat und NSDAP, Doc. 65, 66, 67, regarding the sequence of events, Doc. 71
[ 99 ] Wilhelm’s letter to Hitler, F. W. von Preussen, Hohenzollern, 103-104, and Hitler’s answer, 105-108
[ 100 ] Clark, Report, 4, 7, 11
[ 101 ] Brandt, Report, 20, 41-43
[ 102 ] Malinowski, Report, 20-22
[ 103 ] Malinowski, Report, 21
[ 104 ] See the documentation including the judgement by the local court, Kurt Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa” [The Potempa Case
[ 105 ] Andreas Kilb, “Wilhelm wollte Hitler nicht zaehmen”, Interview with Christopher Clark, in: FAZ.net, November 4, 2020
[ 106 ] Kilb, “Wilhelm wollte Hitler nicht zaehmen”, FAZ.net, November 4, 2020
[ 107 ] Klaus-Juergen Mueller, “Nationalkonservative Eliten zwischen Kooperation und Widerstand”[National Conservative Elites between Cooperation and Resistance
[ 108 ] Hugh Trevor Roper, “Hitler’s Kriegsziele”[Hitler’s War Aims
[ 109 ] Bodo Scheurig, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, ein Konservativer gegen Hitler [A Conservative against Hitler
[ 110 ] Quote from the Nazi-Press organ ‘Voelkischer Beobachter’, August 11, 1932, in: Kluke, Potempa, 281-282
[ 111 ] Akten der Reichskanzlei, die Regierung Hitler [Files of the Reichskanzlei, the Hitler Government, hereinafter cited as ‘AdR Hitler’
[ 112 ] The details of the enabling law, Irene Strenge, “Das Ermaechtigungsgesetz vom 24. Maerz 1933” [The Enabling Law of March 24, 1933
[ 113 ] Pyta, Hindenburg, 820-823
[ 114 ] Regarding the alliance of the elites, Martin Broszat, “Der Zweite Weltkrieg: ein Krieg der alten Eliten, der Nationalsozialisten oder der Krieg Hitlers?”[The Second World War, a War of the old Elites, of National Socialism or the War of Hitler?
[ 115 ] Clark, Report, 4-5, 7-8, 11-12
[ 116 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 83; to corroborate their position Pyta/Orth are quoting several publications of Martin Sabrow, “Der doppelte Mythos”[The double Myths
[ 117 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 78-90
[ 118 ] Brandt, Report, 23-24, 50-51; regarding Hitler’s invitation, Martin Goertemaker, “Das Ende Preussens, 1933-1947”, in: Preussen, Geschichte eines Mythos, ed. Julius Schoeps (Berlin: Weltbild, 2001): 198-219, 200
[ 119 ] Brandt, Report, 51
[ 120 ] Malinowski, Report, 42
[ 121 ] Hans Wendt, Die Nationalversammlung von Potsdam, Deutschlands grosse Tage 21. Bis 23. Maerz 1933 [The National Assembly of Potsdam, Germany’s Great Experience, March 21-23, 1933
[ 122 ] See the documentation by Klaus Scheel, Der Tag von Potsdam [The Day of Potsdam
[ 123 ] Guido Enderis, “Potsdam spirit hailed, Hindenburg invokes its return as Deputies meet in Old Church, Honor Ex-Crown Prince”, New York Times, March 22, 1933: 1; “Hitler’s Speech at Potsdam”, New York Times, March 22, 1933: 8
[ 124 ] As a contemporary Hindenburg biographer had in mind, Gerhard Schultze-Pfaelzer, Hindenburg und Hitler zur Fuehrung vereint [Hindenburg and Hitler united to lead
[ 125 ] AdR Hitler, Vol. 1, Doc. 46, Denkschrift ueber die Errichtung eines Reichskommissariats fuer Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda [Memorandum on the establishment of a Reich Commissioner for the Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda
[ 126 ] Regarding the role of Goebbels, Hoegen, Held von Tannenberg, 384-386
[ 127 ] Hulbert, Legal Revolution, 333
[ 128 ] Hulbert, Legal Revolution, 343; Bracher, Machtergreifung, 152, points out that the day of ‘national uprising’ should be rather called the ‘day of national oppression’ because the other half of the people was not represented at the Potsdam festivities; Hans Mommsen, “Die deutschen Eliten und der Mythos des nationalen Aufbruchs von 1933” [The German Elites and the Myth of National Uprising in 1933
[ 129 ] AdR Hitler, Vol. 1, Doc. 44, Ministerbesprechung vom 7. Maerz 1933 [Ministerial meeting, March 7, 1933
[ 130 ] See the depiction of the event, Pyta, Hindenburg, 820-826, where he is emphasizing the unity and deepening of the relationship between Hindenburg and Hitler, without mentioning his later thesis of a potential power struggle or competition between National Conservatives and Hitler
[ 131 ] Hoegen, Held von Tannenberg, 384-386
[ 132 ] Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe, Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen [The German Catastrophe, Reflections and Memories
[ 133 ] This is reflected by a special feature as a commemoration of the opening session of the Reichstag at the Garrison Church in Potsdam on March 21, 1933, a ‘state act’ to be remembered, “Der Staatsakt in Potsdam, Blaetter der Erinnerung an die feierliche Eroeffnung des Reichstags am 21. Maerz 1933” featuring a summary of the event with the speeches of Hindenburg and Hitler (and Goering’s as the President of the Reichstag at the Krolloper in Berlin later that afternoon) in a special typeset without the usual columns, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 8. Wahlperiode, Vol. 457 (Berlin, 1934): 1-14
[ 134 ] Bracher, Machtergreifung, 144
[ 135 ] Guido Enderis, “Nazis order Reich to celebrate Unity”, New York Times, March 19, 1933, 1; “Planes to patrol Reich Celebration”, New York Times, March 20, 1920, 5
[ 136 ] AdR Hitler, Vol. 1, Doc. 43, Vermerk Meissners ueber eine Besprechung zur Gestaltung der Eroeffnungsfeier des Reichstages, 7. 3. 1933 [Meissner's note about a discussion on the organization of the opening ceremony of the Reichstag, March 7, 1933
[ 137 ] Karl-Dietrich Bracher, “Stufen totalitärer Gleichschaltung: Die Befestigung der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1933/34”[Levels of totalitarian conformity: The consolidation of the National Socialist rule 1933/34
[ 138 ] Bracher, Machtergreifung, 146
[ 139 ] “Text of Dictatorship Act”, New York Times, March 24, 1933, 1; “Speech of Hitler in Reichstag on his Policies for Germany”, New York Times, March 24, 1933, 2; Guido Enderis, “Hitler is supreme under Enabling Act”, New York Times, March 27, 1933, 5; “Hindenburg less active, Hitler to issue decrees with more authority than Predecessors, bars a Monarchy now”, New York Times, March 24, 1933, 1; Harold Callender, “The German Mind in a Ferment”, New York Times, April 30, 1933, SM 1
[ 140 ] AdR Hitler, Vol. 1, Doc. 68, Ministerbesprechung vom 20. Maerz 1933 [Ministerial Meeting, March 20, 1933
[ 141 ] Hubatsch, Hindenburg, Doc. 106, Protocol of the cabinet meeting of March 20, 1932, 371-374
[ 142 ] Hubatsch, Hindenburg, Doc. 105, Protocol of cabinet meeting on January 30, 1933, 369-371, where Hitler is stating, that they needed to eliminate the communist seats in the Reichstag in order to pass the enabling law and Hugenberg and Papen concur; also Hitler was afraid in case of a KPD-ban there could be a general strike, but the Reichswehr was not to be used in case of its suppression; their only focus was supposed to be on a foreign enemy; while the Foreign Minister, v. Neurath, proposed that a KPD-ban combined with a general strike needed to be avoided; in Doc. 106, 371-374, Minister of the Interior, Frick, is stating that in - order to pass the enabling act – they would have to change the procedures of the Reichstag, and count all the missing members as ‘present’
[ 143 ] Hitler, Speech, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Vol. 457, 2nd Session, March 23, 1933, 36 (D); Bracher, Machtergreifung, 166
[ 144 ] Hitler, Speech, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Vol. 457, 2nd Session, March 23, 1933, 38 (A-C)
[ 145 ] Pyta, Hindenburg, 811-812
[ 146 ] As an example, AdR Hitler, Vol. I, Doc. 10, 15, 20, 23, 39, 40, 42, 51, 58 (Hitler in an answer to Papen is denying any attacks of the SA on foreign dipolomats and is comparing them with the revolution of 1918, meaning any encroachments now are nothing compared with the ‘crimes’ of the ‘November criminals’ back then
[ 147 ] See also the diary of Reinhold Quaatz (DNVP), Die Deutschnationalen und die Zerstorerung der Weimarer Rpublik, aus dem Tagebuch von Reinhold Quaatz 1928-1933 [The German Nationals and the Destruction of The Weimar Republic, from the diary of Reinhold Quaatz
[ 148 ] The anti-Jewish actions, Christoph Dipper, “Der Deutsche Widerstand und die Juden” [The German Resistance and the Jews
[ 149 ] Christian Goeschel and Nikolaus Wachsmann, “Before Auschwitz: The Formation of the Nazi Concentration Camps, 1933-1939”, Journal of Contemporary History 45, no. 3 (2010), 515-534; Michael Wildt, “Die ersten 100 Tage der Regierung Hilters”[The First 100 Days of Hitler’s Government
[ 150 ] F. W. von Preussen, Hohenzollern, 207
[ 151 ] Scheurig, Kleist-Schmenzin, 119-125
[ 152 ] F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 204
[ 153 ] The original letters and telegrams can be viewed in facsimile, Arne Semsrott, “Der braune Adel und die Nazis: Wir veroeffentlichen die Briefe von Kronprinz Wilhelm an Hitler”, in: www.fragdenstaat.de (Nov. 14, 2019)
[ 154 ] “Ex-Crown Prince denies Atrocities”, New York Times, 14
[ 155 ] Clark, Report, 16
[ 156 ] Clark, Report, 5-6, 8-9, 10, 12-13, 14, 16-17
[ 157 ] Malinowski, Report, 36-37
[ 158 ] “Ex-Crown Prince denies Atrocities”, New York Times, 14
[ 159 ] Ian Kershaw, Hitlers Freunde in England. Lord Londonderry und der Weg in den Krieg [Hitler’s Friends in England, Lord Londonderry and the Path to War
[ 160 ] Kershaw, Hitlers Freunde, 82; regarding foreign policy, Ullrich, Hitler, 528-567, 754-838
[ 161 ] The letter is quoted extensively by Lothar Machtan, Der Kaisersohn bei Hitler [The Kaiser’s Son with Hitler
[ 162 ] Machtan, Kaisersohn, 291
[ 163 ] Machtan, Kaisersohn, 292
[ 164 ] Kaienburg, “Rolle SA und SS”, 163-177
[ 165 ] “Ex-Crown Prince denies Atrocities”, New York Times, 14
[ 166 ] Goebbels, Tagebuecher (Diaries), 25. 3. 1933, quoted by Malinowski, Report, 27-28
[ 167 ] Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933-1938 [National Socialist Foreign Policy, 1033-1938
[ 168 ] Klaus-Juergen Mueller, “Zu Struktur und Eigenart der nationalkonservativen Opposition bis 1938 – Innenpolitischer Machtkampf, Kriegsverhinderungspolitik und Eventualstaatsstreich” [On the structure and character of the National-Conservative Opposition until 1938 - domestic Power Struggle, War Prevention Policy and eventual Coup d'état
[ 169 ] As Hitler has stated in a secret speech to the German Press, Wilhelm Treue, “Hitlers Rede vor der Deutschen Presse (November 10, 1938)” [Hitler’s Speech to the German Press, November 10, 1938
[ 170 ] A detailed account of these activities, Alfred Spiess, Heiner Lichtenstein, Unternehmen Tannenberg; Der Anlass zum Zweiten Weltkrieg [The Tannenberg Enterprise, the Pretext for World War II
[ 171 ] F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 222
[ 172 ] Quotes from Brandt, Report, 34-35
[ 173 ] Hans O. Eglau, Fritz Thyssen, Hitlers Goenner und Geisel [Fritz Thyssen, Hitler’s Patron and Hostage
[ 174 ] Klaus-Juergen Mueller, “Deutsche Militaer-Elite”, in: Broszat, Schwabe, Eliten, 285-289, 289: “This consensus was also not in danger, when Hitler in 1941 initiated the attack on the Soviet Union as a race-motivated war of annihilation.”
[ 175 ] Regarding Hitler’s intentions and policies from a contemporary perspective, G. E. W. Johnson, “Hitler or Hohenzollern?”, The North American Review 238, no. 3 (1934): 513-523
[ 176 ] Bruening, Memoirs, reports a meeting with the Crown Prince regarding the restoration of the monarchy, 520: “But he [Wilhelm
[ 177 ] F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 207-208, 210; Jonas, Kronprinz, 242
[ 178 ] Jonas, Kronprinz, 290-295, 291
[ 179 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, S. 223
[ 180 ] While Herre, Kronprinz Wilhelm, 176, 199, 202, 214, 220-223, 226, and Jonas, Kronprinz, 216-217, 222, 236, 239, 242, 247, still points towards the importance of the restoration concept for the Crown Prince’ motives; Jonas is also saying that Wilhelm didn’t believe in it after Hitler’s seizure of power, that publications for NS-Propaganda probably were made against his will and is guessing that he was restrained by financial dependency on the Nazi’s good will regarding his properties, 242-243, 251
[ 181 ] F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, is emphasizing the failure of the efforts of Wilhelm II. and the Crown Prince by 1933, as the Nazis curbed any monarchical organization in 1934, 120-129, 201-202, 207, 210, 215, 222-223, and is guessing that Wilhelm could not be too critical of the Nazis having to show restraint because he was worried about potential interventions by the regime towards his properties according to the enabling act, 212, 223
[ 182 ] Clark, Report, 15-16
[ 183 ] Michael Epkenhans, “Der Verfall des monarchischen Gedankens in Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg” [The Decline of Monarchical Thought in Germany during the First World War
[ 184 ] “The Former German Emperor”, Current History 9 (March 1, 1919): 437-439
[ 185 ] Stribrny, Kandidatur, 198-212
[ 186 ] F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 253, is quoting Hitler’s speech on March 23, 1933
[ 187 ] F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 255
[ 188 ] Clark, Report, 8
[ 189 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 14
[ 190 ] Bruening, Memoiren, 453, 512 is describing a meeting with Hindenburg who envisions a solution that involves the sons of the Crown Prince, while he is also refusing any solution for a restoration in general (except with Wilhelm II.), which means that Hindenburg was – like Hiler - effectively against a restoration and wanted to postpone it indefinitely
[ 191 ] Bruening, Memoiren, 520-521; Pyta, Hindenburg, 749
[ 192 ] Jonas, Kronprinz Wilhelm, 242; F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 210
[ 193 ] Clark, Report, 8
[ 194 ] F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 121-122
[ 195 ] Pyta, Hindenburg, 749, decribes the activities of the Kaiser to intervene with Hindenburg through Mackensen in November 1932
[ 196 ] Karina Urbach, “Nuetzliche Idioten, die Hohenzollern und Hitler” [Useful Idiots, the Hohenzollern and Hitler
[ 197 ] Sally Marks, “’My Name Is Ozymandias’: The Kaiser in Exile”, Central European History 16, No. 1 (1983): 122-170, John C. G. Roehl, Wilhelm II., Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900-1941, transl. Sheila de Bellaigue, Roy Bridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 1164-1187; Lothar Machtan, Kaisersturz. Vom Scheitern im Herzen der Macht [The fall of the Kaiser, from the failure at the heart of power
[ 198 ] Jonas, Kronprinz, 170-172, F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 193-194
[ 199 ] Clark, Report, 15-16
[ 200 ] Regarding the finances of the Hohenzollern there is only a small amount of information available, John C. G. Roehl, “Hof und Hofgesellschaft unter Kaiser Wilhelm II.”[Court and its Society under Kaiser Wilhelm II.
[ 201 ] F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 218
[ 202 ] Sigurd v. Ilsemann, Der Kaiser in Holland, Vol. 2: Monarchie und Nationalsozialismus, 1924 – 1941 [The Kaiser in Holland, Vol. 2: Monarchy and National Socialism
[ 203 ] F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 211
[ 204 ] Ilsemann, Kaiser in Holland, Vol. 2, 214-215, 216; Ilsemann states, that – after Hitler’s statements in 1933 - the Kaiser knew it was over
[ 205 ] T. R. Ybarra, “Footing the Bills for Germany’s Imperial Spendthrift”, New York Times, September 25, 1921: 40, listing the installments sent to Holland in 1918-1920; “100,000,000 Marks sent to Kaiser in Exile, Prussian Socialists demand List of House Furnishings forwarded to Doorn Mansion”, New York Times, November 5, 1920, 17
[ 206 ] Cyril Brown, “Kaiser threatened to return to Germany, used that Argument to force Prussia to send more Money”, New York Times, Aug. 4, 1921, 2; further details, Kurt Heinig, Hohenzollern (Berlin: Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschaft, 1921); Roehl, Hofgesellschaft, 80-87
[ 207 ] Roehl, Hofgesellschaft, 83-85
[ 208 ] “The Hohenzollern Fortune”, Current History 13 (Feb. 1, 1921): 274-277, 276
[ 209 ] Jonas, Kronprinz, 287
[ 210 ] Jonas, Kronprinz, 296-297
[ 211 ] Clark, Report, 16
[ 212 ] Malinowski, Report, 20-21, points out that the attorney for the Hohenzollern, Putzier, has asserted in 2013 that the letters between the Crown Prince and Kurt v. Schleicher demonstrate, “that Crown Prince Wilhelm didn’t want to enable a national socialist administration, and on the contrary wanted to prevent it” (just like Pyta/Orth in their report), while Malinowski calls it a “gross distortion of the real events which are well documented by research and primary sources”
[ 213 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 4, 7, 29, 30, 35, 40, 42, 44, 94, 143
[ 214 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 90-105, 98-100,
[ 215 ] Hentschel, Weimar, Doc. II, “Briefe vom Leiter des Wehramts der NSDAP, General Hörauf, an den Kronprinzen Wilhelm”, 150-154, in fact Hoerauf’s letters to the Crown Prince are not only speculative but invalidate the core issue of Pyta/Orth, that Schleicher wanted to split the NS-party, in pointing out – on Dec. 13, 1932 - that the current Government could not have any interest in the split or demise of the NSDAP, ‘because of the numerous valuable forces present in it, and because she has actually understood to bring back a considerable part of the workers into the national camp, who otherwise would go to the Left’ (p. 152)
[ 216 ] Udo Kissenkoetter, Gregor Strasser und die NSDAP [Gregor Strasseer and the NSDAP
[ 217 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 41-42
[ 218 ] Henry A. Turner, “The Myth of Chancellor v. Schleichers Querfront Strategy”, Central European History 41, no. 4 (2008): 673-681; Jasper, Zaehmung, 115-125; Axel Schildt, Militärdiktatur mit Massenbasis, die Querfrontkonzeption der Reichswehrführung um General von Schleicher am Ende der Weimarer Republik [Military Dictatorship with a Mass Base, the Transverse Conception of the Reichswehr Leadership around General von Schleicher at the End of the Weimar Republic
[ 219 ] Pyta, Hindenburg, 769
[ 220 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 7-11
[ 221 ] Peter Hayes, “A Question Mark with Epaulettes? Kurt von Schleicher and Weimar Politics”, Journal of Modern History 52, no. 1 (1980): 35-65, 38-39, 48
[ 222 ] Hayes, Schleicher, 44-50
[ 223 ] Strenge, Kurt v. Schleicher, 118-121
[ 224 ] Richard Breitman, “On German Social Democracy and General Schleicher 1932-33”, Central European History 9, no. 3 (1976): 352-378; Vogelsang, Reichswehr, 316; Larry E. Jones, “Taming the Nazi beast, Kurt v. Schleicher and the End of the Weimar Republic”, in: From Weimar to Hitler: Studies in the dissolution of the Weimar Republic and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1932-34, ed. Hermann Beck, Larry E. Jones (New York: Berghahn, 2019): 23-51, 28-29
[ 225 ] AdR Schleicher, Doc. 71.1, 307; Winkler, Weimar, 585
[ 226 ] On the split of the DNVP, Thomas Mergel, “Das Scheitern des deutschen Tory-Konservatismus, die Umformung der DNVP zu einer rechtradikalen Partei, 1928-1932”[The Failure of German Tory Conservatism, the Change of the DNVP to a right-wing radical Party, 1928-1932
[ 227 ] The ideological differences between People’s Conservatives and the Nazis, Jonas, Die Volkskonservativen, 9-15, the support of Schleicher, 127-129; Bracher, Aufloesung, 322
[ 228 ] Winkler, Weimar, 526
[ 229 ] Axel Schildt, “Die Illusion der konservativen Alternative” [The Illusion of a conservative Alternative
[ 230 ] Schleicher’s statement to Puender, Oct. 8, 1932, see the diary of Hermann Puender, Politik in der Reichskanzlei, Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1929-1932 [Politics in the Reichskanzlei, Recordings between 1929 and 1932
[ 231 ] Thilo Vogelsang, “Zur Politik Schleichers gegenueber der NSDAP 1932” [Schleicher’s Politics towards the NSDAP 1932
[ 232 ] Vogelsang, “Politik Schleichers”, 90
[ 233 ] Urbach, Useful Idiots, 541
[ 234 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 98, point out that the Crown Prince sent letters to Papen and Jung is based on the memory of his sister, Viktoria Luise, and the adjutant of the former Kaiser, v. Ilsemann; the original letters by itself seem to be lost
[ 235 ] Pyta/Orth, Report, 98-99
[ 236 ] Hermann Mau, “Die "Zweite Revolution": Der 30. Juni 1934” [The second Revolution, June 30, 1934
[ 237 ] Reiner Moeckelmann, Franz von Papen, Hitlers ewiger Vasall [Franz v. Papen, Hitlers eternal Vassal
[ 238 ] Ullrich, Hitler I, 514
[ 239 ] Rainer Orth, “Der Amtssitz der Opposition”? Politik und Staatsumbaupläne im Büro des Stellvertreters des Reichskanzlers in den Jahren 1933–1934 [The official seat of the opposition? Politics and state restructuring plans in the office of the Deputy Chancellor from 1933–1934
[ 240 ] Rosnan Magub, Edgar Julius Jung, right-wing enemy of the Nazis: a political biography (Rochester, N. Y.: Camden House, 2017): 191-226; Sebastian Maass, Die andere deutsche Revolution: Edgar Julius Jung und die metaphysischen Grundlagen der Konservativen Revolution [The other German Revolution, E. J. Jung and the metaphysical Basis of a Conservative Revolution
[ 241 ] Werner E. Braatz, “Two Neo-Conservative Myths in Germany 1919-32, the ‘Third Reich’ and the ‘New State’”, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 32, no. 4 (1971): 569-584, 584: “The neo-conservatives had failed to find a third way between parliamentary democracy and totalitarian dictatorship. Indeed, by destroying the institutional framework of the democratic republic, they had paved the way for an age of caesarism under the sway of a single party - the Nazis.”
[ 242 ] Jung’s statement about their responsibility, Heinz Hoehne, “Mordsache Roehm III” [The Murder Case of Roehm, Part III
[ 243 ] Regarding the ‘plans’ of the oposition, Guenther von Tschirschky, Erinnerungen eines Hochverraeters [Memoirs of a Traitor
[ 244 ] Tschirschky, Erinnerungen, 154-163, 172-179; Orth, Amtssitz, 519-530, 527, states that the “action plan” failed, because the ‘opposition’ group during the crucial days after June 17, 1934, could not get Papen to go see Hindenburg to initiate the chain of events that was supposed to cause the demise of the regime
[ 245 ] Tschirschky, Erinnerungen, 176-178
[ 246 ] Kirstin A. Schaefer, Werner von Blomberg, Hitlers erster Feldmarschall [Hitler’s first Field Marshal
[ 247 ] Klaus- Juergen Mueller, Das Heer und Hitler, Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime, 1933-1940 [The Army and Hitler, Army and national socialistic Regime
[ 248 ] Hoehne, “Mordsache Roehm III”, 139: “The SA remained an obstacle on his way to sole rule, because without a disempowerment of the army of brown shirts, the generals of the Reichswehr would not leave it up to Hitler to succeed Hindenburg”.
[ 249 ] Regarding the so-called ‘Roehm-Putsch’ as it was euphemistically labeled by the Nazis, Eleanor Hancock, “The Purge of the SA Reconsidered: "An Old Putschist Trick", Central European History 44, no. 4 (2011): 669-683; David Jablonsky, “Roehm and Hitler: The Continuity of Political-Military Discord”, Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 3 (1988): 367-386
[ 250 ] Maass, Revolution, 135, 137
[ 251 ] Peter Hoffman, The History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977); Schmaedeke, Widerstand, contains no entry describing Papen’s Vice chancellery as a center of the ‘opposition’ to Hitler, and is only mentioned by Schildt, “Konservative Alternative”, 163, as a ‘special aspiration’ of Papen and others for a ‘catholic-fascistic’ regime
[ 252 ] Leonidas Hill, “Towards a New History of German Resistance to Hitler”, Central European History 14, no. 3 (1981): 369-399 is proposing a new history of the resistance to overcome the main focus on the National Conservatives
[ 253 ] Theodore S. Hamerow, On the Road to the Wolf’s Lair. German Resistance to Hitler (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 19-34, 83-114; Hans Christoph Kraus, “Der konservative Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus” [The conservative Resistance to National Socialism
[ 254 ] For the ‘basic sonsensus’, Klaus-Juergen Mueller, “Militaerische Elite”, 289
[ 255 ] Regarding the goal of Foreign Minister von Neurath for Germany to leave the Voelkerbund, Hans Juergen Doescher, SS und Auswaertiges Amt im Dritten Reich [SS and Foreign Office in the Third Reich
[ 256 ] Mueller, “Deutsche Militaerelite”, 260-263
[ 257 ] The Crown Prince published two articles in support of the referendum of the Hitler administration to leave the Voelkerbund and elect a new Reichstag completely with NS-candidates, Ullrich, Hitler I, 538-539; Clark, Report, 5-6, 8-9; Malinowski, Report, 34
[ 258 ] Doescher, SS und Auswaertiges Amt, 71, 114-118, is pointing out that in 1937 many diplomats considered to become members of the SS that the personal administration of SS talked about a Massenflucht (mass flight)
[ 259 ] Mueller, “Deutsche Militaer-Elite”, 274-275, 280
[ 260 ] Fredrick L. Schuman, “The Third Reich’s Road to War”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 175 (September 1934): 33-43; Frederick L. Schuman, “Nazi Dreams of World Power”, Current History 39 (1934): 535-541; Frederick Birchall, “Reich is thinking of War despite its talk of Peace”, New York Times, October 8, 1933
[ 261 ] Mueller, “Deutsche Militaer-Elite”, 282-283
[ 262 ] Bernd-Juergen Wendt, Grossdeutschland. Aussenpolitik und Kriegsvorbereitung des Hitler-Regimes [Larger Germany, Foreign Policy and War Preparation of Hitler’s Regime
[ 263 ] Klaus-Juergen Mueller, “Zu Struktur und Eigenart der nationalkonservativen Opposition”, 338-339
[ 264 ] Mueller, “Deutsche Militaer-Elite”, 288-289
[ 265 ] Cark Dirks, Karl-Heinz Jansen, Der Krieg der Generaele, Hitler als Werkzeug der Wehrmacht [War of the Generals, Hitler as a Tool of the Army
[ 266 ] Mueller, “Deutsche Militaer-Elite”, 240-247
[ 267 ] Ueberschaer, “Militaeropposition”, 345-367, 348-350
[ 268 ] Hamerow, Wolf’s lair, 289
[ 269 ] Mueller, “Deutsche Militaer-Elite”, 289
[ 270 ] War, Pacification and Mass Murder, 1939. The Einsatzgruppen in Poland, ed. Juergen Matthaeus, Jochen Boehler, Klaus-Michael Mallmann (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014); Helmut Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen. Die Truppen des Weltanschauungskrieges 1938-1942 (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1985)
[ 271 ] Johannes Hürter, Felix Römer, “Alte und neue Geschichtsbilder von Widerstand und Ostkrieg, Zu Hermann Gramls Beitrag ‘Massenmord und Militäropposition’" [Old and new historical images of resistance and the Eastern War. On Hermann Graml's contribution ‘Mass murder and military opposition’
[ 272 ] Hamerow, Wolf’s Lair, 350
[ 273 ] Jonas, Kronprinz, 270-276; F. W. v. Preussen, Hohenzollern, 268-290
[ 274 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 243, seems surprised about the ‘convergence’ of their interest in the common takeover of power to eliminate the Weimar Republic
[ 275 ] Hubatsch, Hindenburg, 1, is defending the President for his decision to appoint Hitler and is stating that criticism of this decision was made, “without the reasons for these decisions, the general timing, and that the compulsion of necessity was being duly taken into account.”
[ 276 ] A selection of these memoirs and its reviews that tried to correct the omissions and distortions, Franz v. Papen, Memoirs (London: Deutsch, 1952); Franz v. Papen, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse (Muenchen: List, 1952); reviewed by Werner Conze, “Papens Memoiren”, Historische Zeitschrift 175, no. 2 (1953): 307-317; Moeckelmann, Franz v. Papen; Hjalmar Schacht, 76 Jahre meines Lebens (Bad Woerishofen, Kindler & Schiemeyer, 1953), reviewed by Fritz Neumark, “Hjalmar Schacht. Leben und Wirken einer umstrittenen Persönlichkeit”, Finanz-Archiv 38 (1980) 478-485; Lutz Graf Schwerin v. Krosigk, Memoiren (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1977); reviewed by Peter C. Witt, “Memoiren”, Historische Zeitschrift 227 (1978): 727-728; Otto Meissner, Staatssekretaer bei Ebert, Hindenburg, Hitler: der Schicksalsweg des deutschen Volkes von 1918 - 1945, wie ich ihn erlebte [State Secretary with Ebert, Hindenbirg and Hitler
[ 277 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 234, German original: “Lange bevor die nationalsozialistische Bewegung die Mehrheit des Volkes erfasste, stand ich mit Ihnen in persoenlichem Gedanken austausch und setzte mich fuer Sie und hre Bewegung mit warmen Herzen ein. Seit der Machtergreifung hielt ich mich aus begreiflichen Gruenden zurueck und dachte nur daran, wie ich am Aufbauwerk des Deutsche Volkes mithelfen koennte. Ich bin in Wort und Schrift fuer sie und Ihre grossen Ideen eingetreten, wo mir dazu nur irgendwie Gelegenheit gegeben wurde. Auch meine sehr weitgehenden Beziehungen zum Ausland setzte ich, wo es nur moeglich war, fuer das Werk, dem sie dienen, ein.”; Wilhelm tried to get back in Hitler’s ‘good book’ in using his secretary to send numerous documents of support to Viktoria von Dirksen, a confidant of the Fuehrer, in order to become a public personality again, that would fuerther advance the ‘German cause’ (p. 236)
[ 278 ] Machtan, Kronprinz, 237
[ 279 ] The reports were leaked by the comedian Jan Boehmermann in his late-night show ‘Neo Maganzin Royale’ of the Second German Public TV channel on November 14, 2019, Joerg Haentzschel, “Jan Boehmermann, der Aufklaerer”, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, November 15, 2019
[ 280 ] Eva-Maria Schnurr, “Der Kronprinz ging mit jedem Gegner der Weimarer Republik ins Bett”, Interview mit Karina Urbach, Spiegel.de, November 26, 2019; Karina Urbach, Hitler’s heimliche Helfer, der Adel im Dienst der Macht [Hitler’s secret Helpers, the Nobility in service of Power
[ 281 ] Winkler, Weimar, 477
[ 282 ] Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, “Zur neuen Selbstfindung Oesterreichs durch Geschichtskrisen und Widerstand, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Österreich-Ideologie der Dreißiger Jahre” [On the new self-discovery of Austria through historical Crises and Resistance, with special Consideration of the Austrian Ideology of the thirties
[ 283 ] Kurt Bauer, “Hitler und der Juli-Putsch 1934 in Oesterreich” [Hitler and the July-Putsch in Austria in 1934
[ 284 ] Norbert Schausberger, “Oesterreich und die nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik” [Austria and National Socialistic Foreign Policy
[ 285 ] Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Oesterreich gegen Hitler, Europas erste Abwehrfront 1933-1938 [Austria against Hitler, Europe’s first Front of Resistance, 1933-38
[ 286 ] Hans Mommsen, “Ausnahmezustand als Herrschaftstechnik des NS-Regimes” [State of emergency as a technique of rule of the Nazi regime
[ 287 ] Quoted by Ullrich, Hitler I, 354
[ 288 ] Roehl, Abyss, 969; Hartmut Pogge von Strandtmann, Immanuel Geiss, Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmoeglichen. Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs [The necessity of the impossible. Germany on the eve of the First World War
[ 289 ] Roehl, Abyss, 1032
[ 290 ] Roehl, Abyss, 1032
[ 291 ] Kronprinz Wilhelm, Erinnerungen [Memoirs
[ 292 ] Regarding the German ‘innocence’ campaign there are only a few studies available, Hermann J. Wittgens, The German Foreign Office campaign against the Versailles Treaty, an examination of the activities of the Kriegsschuldreferat in the United States (Ph. D. diss., University of Washington, 1970); Holger H. Herwig, “Clio Deceived: Patrotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War”, International Security 12, no. 1 (1987): 5-44; Erich J. C. Hahn, “The German Foreign Ministry and the Question of War Guilt in 1918-1919”, in: German Nationalism and the European Response, ed. Carole Fink, Isabel Hull, James McGregor Knox (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985): 43-70; Ulrich Heinemann, Die verdraengte Niederlage. Politische Oeffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage in der Weimarer Republik [The suppressed defeat. Public Discussion and the War Guilt Question in the Weimar Republic
[ 293 ] Eckart Conze, “Verhasster Vertrag, Versailles als Propagandawaffe gegen die Weimarer Republik” [The hated Treaty, Versailles as a Weapon of Propaganda against the Weimar Republic
[ 294 ] In a rare case of realism, Hans Delbrueck, “Die strategische Grundfrage des Welkrieges”[The strategically decisive question of the World War
[ 295 ] Hamerow, Wolf’s Lair, 19-82
[ 296 ] Crown Prince Wilhelm’s study is called, Ich suche die Wahrheit (‘I search for the Truth’)
[ 297 ] Peter Hoeres, “Versailler Vertrag: ein Frieden, der keiner war” [The Versailles Treaty, a peace that wasn’t
[ 298 ] This is the title of the study of Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Duesseldorf: Droste, 1961) that finally changed the discussion about the First World War forever [engl. transl.: Germany’s aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1967)
[ 299 ] Malinowski, Report, 42
[ 300 ] Dieter Pohl, “Der Holocaust und die anderen NS-Verbrechen: Wechselwirkungen und Zusammenhaenge” [The Holocaust and other crimes, Interactions and Context
[ 301 ] Kronprinz Wilhelm (Ed.), Deutschland in Waffen [Germany with Arms
[ 302 ] Regarding the NS-ideology of violence and war, Broszat, “Zweiter Weltkrieg”, 40-43
[ 303 ] Jonas, Kronprinz, 281-310
[ 304 ] This time the Allies forced Germany to surrender ‘unconditionally’, changing the political structures that had helped Germany to unleash two World Wars, and established their own tribunal (IMT), that – in contrast to the German trials in Leipzig in the 1920s - prosecuted war crimes initiating first a main trial against the top Nazi-elite and then twelve follow-on trials against those people who became Hitler’s accomplices and executors, Der Nationalsozialismus vor Gericht: die allierten Prozesse gegen Kriegsverbrecher und Soldaten, 1943 – 1952 [National Socialism in Court, Allied Trials of War Criminals and Soldiers, 1943-1952
[ 305 ] Regarding the return of the old elites in Germany after 1949 and the exculpation of the Nazi-crimes, Der halbierte Rechtsstaat, Demokratie und Recht in der frühen Bundesrepublik und die Integration von NS-Funktionseliten [The halved Rule of Law, Democracy and Justice in the early Federal Republic and the Integration of Nazi functional Elites
[ 306 ] Frei, Adenauer’s Germany, 312
[ 307 ] Thomas W. Maulucci, “German Diplomats and the Myth of the Two Foreign Office”, in: A Nazi Past: recasting German identity in postwar Europe, ed. David A. Messenger, Katrin Paehler (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015): 139-167, 139
[ 308 ] Clark, Report, 16: “In those years the Crown Prince became a pure fellow traveler (Mitlaeufer).”